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Abstract
We formulate a model of computational metacreativ-
ity. The model consists of various aspects of creative
self-awareness that potentially contribute, in various
combinations, to the metacreative capabilities of a cre-
ative system. Our model is inspired by a psychologi-
cal view of metacreativity promoting the awareness of
one’s thoughts during the creative process, and draws
from the field of self-adaptive software systems to ex-
plicate different viewpoints of metacreativity in creative
systems. The model is designed to help in analyz-
ing metacreative capabilities of creative systems, and
to guide the development of creative systems in a more
autonomous and adaptive direction.
Introduction
Metacreativity, the capability to reflect on one’s own cre-
ative processes and to adjust them, is an essential part of any
creative system that could be claimed to have creative auton-
omy or intrinsic motivation. For instance, Jennings (2010)
argues that autonomous change, the capability of a system
to modify its standards by its own decision, is a requirement
for creative autonomy. Metacreativity and creative auton-
omy allow the system to evolve and, eventually, to create ar-
tifacts outside the control of the programmer or other agents.
Metacreativity is the subject of various discussions in the
field of computational creativity (see, e.g. Buchanan (2001),
Colton (2009), Grace and Maher (2015), Jennings (2010) to
name a few). Despite a general aspiration towards building
systems with greater creative autonomy and a general inter-
est in metacreativity, explicit models of what metacreativity
is and how it can be achieved have been scarce. Our goal is
to add to the understanding of computational metacreativity
by proposing concepts, components and processes useful in
characterizing and also building creative systems.
The ability of a computational system to modify itself is
known in software architecture research as self-adaptivity
(Salehie and Tahvildari 2009; Lewis et al. 2015). We draw
from this field of research to derive concepts for metacre-
ative systems.
A key concept for self-adaptivity and metacreativity, both
in humans and machines, is self-awareness, the ability to
be the target of one’s own attention. For a system to be
self-aware of some aspect of itself requires that the sys-
tem explicitly knows of that particular aspect, is able to
monitor it and to control itself in relation to it. We for-
mulate these complementary sub-aspects of self-awareness
as (self-)reflection and (self-)control, loosely following con-
cepts used in autonomous computing (Kephart and Chess
2003). The goal is that reflection and control allow a (cre-
ative) system to make justified decisions about its own be-
havior.
Our emphasis on explicit self-awareness implies that the
view of metacreativity is “top-down”: metacreative control
is located in specific components of the system that have
awareness of other parts of the system. The advantage of
this modular approach is that it is easier to explicate self-
awareness and to discuss how and where a system is self-
aware, and the concepts directly suggest possible compo-
nents and their relations for a creative system. The down-
side is that the model is not well-suited for systems where
creativity is an emergent “bottom-up” property arising from
the interaction of multiple (simple) agents or other actors
and where there is no explicit self-awareness.
The contributions and structure of this paper are as fol-
lows. We start by briefly reviewing the background of
metacreativity and self-awareness in computational creativ-
ity, psychology and software systems. We then move on to
our main contribution: a model for metacreativity, consist-
ing of six different types of creative self-awareness in sys-
tems that aim to produce creative artifacts. These aspects
of self-awareness can be used to describe existing metacre-
ative systems or to design new ones. After introducing the
model, we illustrate how different interesting designs of cre-
ative systems can be derived from it. We conclude the paper
with a discussion of the model and its relationship to some
existing concepts related to metacreativity.
Background
We provide here a brief background on three topics relevant
to self-aware metacreative systems: metacreativity as dis-
cussed within the computational creativity community, self-
awareness in psychology, and self-adaptive software system
design.
Metacreativity in Computational Creativity
In the computational creativity literature, the term metacre-
ativity has been used in two kinds of contexts that give it
largely opposite meanings. The first meaning refers to the
programmer of the system as a metacreator and the created
system as a metacreation, to use Veale’s (2015) terminology.
This view is common especially in the musical metacre-
ation literature (see e.g. Pasquier et al. (2017)). The sec-
ond meaning of metacreativity refers to a process by which
creative systems autonomously evolve their creative capa-
bilities. For example, Ventura (2016) characterises metacre-
ativity as the capability of a system to “change its domain
knowledge/summative criteria through learning, interaction,
environmental effects”. In this paper we talk about metacre-
ative systems, i.e., our use of the term ‘metacreation’ coin-
cides with the latter meaning.
The few attempts to explicitly model computational
metacreativity that we have encountered are based on the
idea of transformational creativity. Transformational cre-
ativity was defined by Boden (1992) and more formally de-
scribed in a search-based model by Wiggins (2006). In Wig-
gins’ model, creativity is viewed as search in a space of
possibly creative concepts. The search is governed by rules
which effectively define a system’s search space, the method
of traversing it, and a function for evaluating concepts. A
system is transformationally creative if it changes any of the
rules that govern this search. Grace and Maher (2015) elab-
orate on Wiggins’ model by adding features for modeling an
agent’s expectations and curiosity during the creative search,
and by using this model to evaluate potential rules to direct
the transformational search.
Implemented metacreative systems are usually based on
the transformational creativity paradigm, by invention of
new rules for defining, traversing or evaluating search
spaces. For instance, Colton’s (2001) HR system, originally
designed for mathematical discovery, was extended to dis-
cover meta-theories about its own theory formation. Colton
argues that these meta-theories could be used to extend HR’s
creative capabilities by implementing them as new rules for
the original program. Similarly, in a more recent attempt
Morris, Burton, and Ventura (2012) discuss a culinary sys-
tem that could achieve meta-level capabilities by transform-
ing its evaluation function over time. This type of com-
putational metacreativity is often implied in works describ-
ing transformation of creative search, such as Liapis et al.
(2013).
Metacreativity and Self-Awareness in Psychology
Self-awareness is a central concept to our model of metacre-
ativity. Throughout the paper, we use the term as it is defined
in psychological literature: self-awareness is the capacity to
become the object of one’s own attention (Morin 2006). The
potential to also change oneself is an important aspect of
self-awareness, even if implicit in some discussions. In our
model, we make it explicit by talking about self-control in
relation to self-reflection.
Bruch (1988) has identified metacreativity as being aware
of thoughts and feelings during creative experiences. This
relates metacreativity to self-awareness as defined above.
Bruch also relates metacreative acts to Sternberg’s (1982)
nine element model of problem solving, which takes into
account metacomponential executive processes allowing a
creator to plan, monitor and evaluate its own creative pro-
cess.
One form of executive monitoring is constant oversee-
ing of the solution forming process and being aware of new
problems – and solutions – which arise during the creative
act, e.g., to recognize possibly serendipitous incidents. This
kind of monitoring comes close to ideas of solution-focused
strategy known as ”design thinking”, where a designer uses
synthesis of previous (sub)solutions to find new solutions, or
redefines the problem based on the accumulated information
in order to find an acceptable solution (Cross 1982).
A metacreative person needs to be self-aware of his/her
own creative processes. Self-awareness, more generally,
is an eminent functionality of human cognition. For ex-
ample, Morin (2006) characterizes the contemporary neu-
rocognitive models of consciousness by the perception of
self in time, and by complexity of self-representations.
Neisser (1997) formulates five levels of self-awareness
which describe the development of higher cognitive func-
tions: (1) ecological self consists of perceptual information,
(2) interpersonal self describes raw awareness of social in-
teractions, (3) extended self is able to reflect on itself over
time with no explicit focus on mental states, (4) private self
can process private information, such as thoughts and feel-
ings and (5) self-concept is made of abstract and symbolic
representations of oneself, such as role and identity, in the
end encompassing also meta-self-awareness. Neisser’s self-
awareness levels have served as inspiration for self-adaptive
software systems, from which we draw results.
Self-Adaptive and Self-Aware Software Systems
Metacreativity, as the capability of a creative system to
change its own creative behavior, is closely related to self-
adaptivity in software systems. The challenges of mak-
ing software systems self-adaptive have been primarily ad-
dressed in the domain of software systems (Salehie and
Tahvildari 2009; Camara et al. 2016). Self-adaptive soft-
ware systems are usually closed-loop systems with a feed-
back loop connecting changes in the operating conditions
back to the system (Maes 1987; Salehie and Tahvildari
2009). The changes can originate from the software sys-
tems itself or its context, e.g., an operating environment.
Self-adaptation requires the system to be able to reflect on
the changes, which requires suitable structures of a self-
representation of the system (Maes 1987).
Self-adaptation of software is often architecturally based
on a general control structure such as the MAPE-K model
(Kephart and Chess 2003). The model has two main com-
ponents: a base system that is being managed and a self-
adaptive system taking the control. The self-adaptive sys-
tem has the capability to reflect on the controlling actions
executed over the managed system. The reflection is based
on a monitoring component (the M in MAPE-K) that gauges
the managed system. The input from the monitor feeds
the analyzer (A), which conducts the analyzes for the pur-
poses of planning (P) the adaptive action required. An ex-
ecutor (E) then carries out the action in the managed sys-
tem. The monitor-analyze-plan-execute loop uses a shared
knowledge-base (K) to inform the self-adaptation.
Lewis et al. (2015) elaborate on the basic MAPE-K
kind of model using inspiration from the above-mentioned
Neisser’s (1997) five-level model of consciousness. For con-
ceptualizing self-awareness, they separate and define levels
of awareness for self-aware software (Lewis et al. 2015):
stimulus-awareness, interaction-awareness, time-awareness,
goal-awareness and meta-self-awareness. For the purpose
of constructing self-aware software systems, they propose
an overall architecture with architectural elements explicitly
separating the responsibilities regarding self-awareness. The
architecture also distinguishes between private and public
forms of self-awareness based on whether a change origi-
nates and the awareness relates to something within or out-
side the system itself, respectively. However, their private
awareness concerns the hardware of the systems itself and is
not purely awareness about the software, whereas the defi-
nitions of self-adaptation focusing more clearly on software
may speak of an evaluation on how well the software is ac-
complishing its task, e.g., in terms of performance (Laddaga
1997).
A Self-Awareness Model for Metacreativity
We next define our self-awareness-based model for metacre-
ativity. We start by defining six possible aspects of creative
self-awareness in systems that create artifacts. We then show
how different types of systems can be constructed using dif-
ferent combinations of these self-awareness aspects.
Overview of the Model
The model is grounded on the concept of self-awareness as
the basis of meaningful self-change in a creative system. We
define six aspects of self-awareness for creative systems and
outline how these aspects contribute to a creative system’s
ability to reason about (reflect) and make decisions of (con-
trol) its own behavior. These types of self-awareness will be
elaborated on later in this section.
Artifact-awareness A creative system that is artifact-aware
is able to monitor the artifacts it creates and to adjust what
kind of artifacts are generated based on the observed in-
formation.
Generator-awareness A creative system that is generator-
aware is able to monitor its generator’s behavior and ad-
just it based on the observed information, possibly re-
designing parts of the generator.
Goal-awareness A goal-aware system can observe how
well it reaches its creative goals, and can modify its be-
havior and the goals themselves if needed.
Interaction-awareness An interaction-aware creative sys-
tem knows that some of its actions constitute interactions
with other agents or its environment, and can decide how
to interact with others in order to influence them or obtain
influences.
Time-awareness A time-aware creative system is informed
of its behavior in time. It can observe historical develop-
ment and anticipate likely future phenomena, and modify
its behavior based on these observations.
Meta-self-awareness A meta-self-aware system can ob-
serve its own self-awareness aspects and influence how
they are exercised.
These self-awareness aspects have both implicit and ex-
plicit mutual relationships, which are shown in Figure 1.
Artifact-awareness and generator-awareness are in a direct
hierarchy, as the generator creates artifacts (Figure 1, bot-
tom middle part). Goal-awareness is prominently related to
artifacts, but it can also be related to any other element in
the system depending on its design. Similarly, interaction-
awareness can be in relation to any component of the system,
but often deals with exchanging artifacts — or information
about them — with external actors. Time-awareness is dif-
ferent from the other aspects, it can only be observed in-
directly and it can not be controlled. Meta-self-awareness
means awareness about any of the above types of self-
awareness; it is also used as an all-encompassing concept
meaning the system’s ability to reflect and control itself and
its own self-awareness aspects.
Self-awareness over an aspect is composed of reflection
and control:
Reflection Reflecting on an aspect means tapping into it,
monitoring it to gain information about it and possibly
processing that information e.g. by generalizing it.
Control Controlling an aspect means adjusting or modify-
ing that aspect.
Both reflection and control are needed for self-awareness:
one is meaningless for metacreativity without the other one.
They both need a target, a component that is monitored and
controlled, and another component (or a set of components)
that is in charge of reflection and control, dubbed here as the
manager of the target.
Each of the self-awareness aspects has a variety of pos-
sible reflection and control types. They range from simple
to complex and, accordingly, we informally talk about weak
and strong reflection and weak and strong control.
Weak reflection refers to severely limited capability to
gain information about the target, e.g. through a black box
function. Strong reflection requires analysis of the observa-
tions and general attention towards how and what is moni-
tored. A strong form of reflection can be “perceiving”: what
is observed is externalized from the system (Grace and Ma-
her 2015).
Weak control covers limited adjustments, e.g. parameter
changes and other actions with low impact. On the other
hand, a system that has strong control over a component may
redesign it by changing, adding or removing parts of it.
Aspects of Creative Self-Awareness
Next, we elaborate on each of the self-awareness aspects and
argue how they are intertwined with a creative system’s ca-







Figure 1: Conceptual drawing of the self-awareness aspects
in a creative system and their relations. Reflection and con-
trol are indicated by white arrows pointing in the direction of
reflection and control. A system can have goals w.r.t. other
aspects of awareness and interaction can relate to various
other components depending on the system’s design. Time-
awareness is omitted from the figure, but could be a property
of any aspect.
Artifact-awareness A property that distinguishes creativ-
ity from mere generation is awareness of the artifacts one
generates (Ventura 2016): a system can hardly be called cre-
ative if it is not able to assess its own artifacts or adjust what
kind of artifacts it generates. An artifact-aware system is not
necessarily yet metacreative.
Many creative systems have an evaluation function for ar-
tifacts, i.e., they reflect on their products. Some other sys-
tems rely on external evaluation; such a system may benefit
from building an internal model, e.g. by machine learning,
of the external evaluation function. This allows the system
then to reflect on artifacts before publishing them, or to mod-
ify generation of artifacts to better fit that model.
Consider, for example, a system that generates metaphors,
figures of speech where an object (tenor) borrows properties
from another object (vehicle). A good metaphor is generally
understandable, interesting and tells more about the tenor –
or from a different angle – than is usual. If the system is
artifact-aware it could, e.g. try to interpret the metaphors it
generates using different background knowledge (strong re-
flection), and modify which object categories (animal, arts,
etc.) the vehicle is drawn from during the generation (weak
control).
Generator-awareness The next logical step to increase
the creative potential of a system is to make the system
aware of its artifact generation process. A system that is
generator-aware is able to monitor the artifact generation
process and to adjust it if needed. This functionality is called
Generator Manager (cf. Figure 1). Generator-awareness
gives the system transformational capabilities, allowing it to
reach a different space of potentially creative artifacts from
what it could reach before.
Returning to the metaphor generator used as an example
above, a generator-aware version could monitor the combi-
nations of tenor and vehicle produced (weak reflection), and
further analyze if the procedure to select the combination
performs poorly (strong reflection). It could then adjust how
the combination is selected from candidate sets of tenors
and vehicles, e.g. by adjusting weights of matching crite-
ria (weak control).
Goal-awareness Creative systems can have various goals
(e.g. maximizing value of artifacts or just exploring a space
of artifacts), and the goals can consist of conflicting crite-
ria making their use non-trivial (e.g. how to balance nov-
elty and value if they tend to be negatively correlated?). A
goal-aware system knows of its own goal(s) and can use that
knowledge to solve some of the issues (e.g. deciding how
to strike a useful balance), or it can even modify its own
goal(s).
At the most concrete level, the goal is defined as a func-
tion over created artifacts (GoalArt in Figure 1). The gener-
ator could use this function to reflect on the artifacts it has
generated, but mere black-box use of an evaluation func-
tion does not count as goal-awareness. For a system to be
goal-aware, it also needs to be able to change the evaluation
standards.
Depending on the system’s design, it can have various
other goals potentially associated with other aspects of self-
awareness (e.g. GoalGen in Figure 1). An illustrative exam-
ple requiring interaction-awareness would be a partial goal
(GoalInt) on pleasing or provoking the user or other agents
in the environment. Goal-awareness therefore is actually an
umbrella term for many different possible goals.
Goal-awareness allows the system to further loosen its
chains from the developer. The system is then not only able
to adjust how the artifacts are generated (if it has artifact and
generator-awareness), but it also has the ability to change
how it perceives artifacts and what it considers as good or
interesting artifacts.
In metaphor generation, the system might monitor the in-
terestingness of tenor and vehicle combinations, along other
measures, and its relation to the overall evaluation covering
a variety of different measures (strong reflection). This re-
flection could then have an impact on how interestingness af-
fects the overall evaluation (weak control). For example, in
a situation where the current formulation of interestingness
is seen counterproductive, its effect could be diminished in
the overall evaluation.
Interaction-awareness Interaction-awareness allows the
system to reason and make informed decisions about its
environment and how it behaves with respect to the envi-
ronment. The system knows that it has components that
can be used to communicate with outside sources, either di-
rectly (e.g. messaging other agents) or indirectly (e.g. leav-
ing pheromones in the environment). Without interaction-
awareness, the system does not have an explicit notion of
the outside environment, and cannot comprehend that some
of its actions constitute communications with others.
A system with strong interaction-awareness can have a
primitive Theory of mind, meaning, it can model the world
outside, including other creative agents and their properties,
such as their assumptions about the original system itself.
Importantly, it can distinct these from its own properties.
An interaction- and artifact-aware metaphor generation
system could model artifact preferences of other agents, and
e.g. observe that a certain agent seems to prefer metaphors
where the vehicle is drawn from the animal kingdom. It
could then use this information to please the agent by com-
municating to it only with metaphors which have an animal
vehicle.
Time-awareness Time-awareness is distinct from the
other self-awareness aspects in several mutually related re-
spects. Time cannot be reflected on its own, nor can it
be controlled. Time can only be observed indirectly via
changes in artifacts, the system’s components or its inter-
actions. Accordingly, time-awareness occurs in conjunction
with the other types of awareness and, more specifically,
their reflections and controls.
For example, a system can be time-aware with respect to
its reflection of artifacts. This allows the system to have an
understanding of its generation history and to anticipate its
future development. Time-awareness with respect to control
of artifacts, in turn, allows the system to make plans for what
to generate over time (if the anticipated future was not sat-
isfactory). For example, the system could design a strategy
of how to approach a perfect instantiation of a certain type
of artifact, e.g, an expressionist painting, over time. It could
deliberately allocate its resources so that they maximize the
strategy’s effectiveness, e.g., it can plan to first explore the
artifact space more broadly, and to later on focus in sub-
spaces with more promising artifacts. Further on, the system
is able to monitor and adjust its strategies when needed.
In a metaphor-generation system, time-awareness could
be utilized to monitor how novelty or interestingness of the
artifacts behaves as a function of time, or how other agents
appreciate the generated artifacts during the system’s lifes-
pan. This information could then be used to form a plan
for what kind of artifacts are communicated to each specific
agent and how this can be achieved in a timely manner.
Meta-self-awareness Meta-self-awareness is awareness
of one’s own self-awareness, so it encompasses all other as-
pects of awareness in a creative system. A meta-self-aware
system is able to monitor its own awarenesses and can po-
tentially merge information from different aspects into a uni-
fying view of the system’s state.
A metacreative system does not necessary need to have
meta-self-awareness, as the system can be metacreative
with respect to a single awareness aspect (except artifact-
awareness). However, systems without meta-self-awareness
have less control over their own behavior.
Consider a meta-self-aware metaphor generation system
which has previously generated metaphors with vehicles in
the category of animals. Assume that the system observes
that it has run out of feasible metaphors with animal vehi-
cles, and that it has previously observed that an agent in the
environment prefers metaphors with vehicles from arts. The
system could then change its generation of artifacts by fixing
the vehicle’s category to arts, and change the system’s inter-
action to prefer communication with the art-oriented agent.
Further, the system could change its evaluation standards to
accommodate the metaphor feedback it receives specifically
from this agent.
Connecting Reflection and Control
Self-awareness allows the system to evolve meaningfully
during its lifespan. However, it has to have apt connections
between reflection and control. We make a distinction be-
tween exogenous and endogenous connection types.
An exogenous connection is given by an outside source
(typically a system’s developer), e.g. as a direct mapping
between observed and controlled parameters or as a pre-
learned model. Exogenous connections do not change dur-
ing the system’s lifespan, and they require that the original
source of this connection has a substantial understanding of
the problem space at design time, something which is not
always feasible – or even desirable. Further, exogenous con-
nections implicitly impose reflection and control types to be
well known in advance.
An endogenous connection is obtained by actively model-
ing how reflection and control are related, e.g using machine
learning or other adaptive models. Unfortunately, due to the
complex or even chaotic nature of many creative applica-
tions and phenomena, learning relationships between con-
trols and effects can be hard. Deciding right control proce-
dures for certain reflected elements can require a substantial
amount of accumulated information from the problem space,
some of which can be obtained by experimentation.
Both exogenous and endogenous connection types are
perfectly valid in metacreative systems and can co-exist in
the same system. The connections can range from simple,
e.g. reflecting and controlling a few parameters in the same
component, to sophisticated structures connecting reflected
elements from various self-awareness aspects to the controls
of others. The most eminent connections operate also on
meta-self-awareness and execute complex reasoning about
how certain reflection should be effected in control.
Example Configurations
We next outline some example configurations of self-
awareness aspects and give name suggestions for them.
Creative We call a system creative (as opposed to merely
generative) if it is aware of its own artifacts and uses strong
reflection and control over them in an exogenously or en-
dogenously connected manner. The behavior of such a sys-
tem changes over time as it controls new artifacts based on
what it already has generated. This does not necessarily im-
ply time-awareness, however.
Self-transforming A self-transforming system modifies
its generator in a way that allows it to reach previously
unattainable areas of a conceptual space. That is to say, the
system is generator- and artifact-aware, and can utilize an
exogenous or endogenous connection between them to come
up with new generators enhancing the system’s capability to
explore the creative space.
Self-guiding A system is said to be self-guiding, if it is
able to make justified long-term plans and change its way
of generating the artifacts if the plan is failing. This requires
the system to have generator-awareness and time-awareness.
A self-guiding system looks at its own generation process
history and estimates how it will be doing in the future if the
generator stays unchanged. If the system predicts that the
current way of generating artifacts is going to be inadequate
in the future, it modifies its generator and starts to make new
estimations about its generator’s future competence.
A self-guiding metaphor generation system may plan to
try to generate as many valuable metaphors as possible with
a generator that specifies a set of properties the vehicle must
have. If the system anticipates that it is not able to gener-
ate any more valuable metaphors with such constraint in its
generator, it may change the constraints, e.g. by specifying
another set of properties.
Autonomously creative A system is autonomously cre-
ative if it changes its goal(s) (Jennings 2010) based on the
information it gains from reflecting over the artifacts. Such
a system is both artifact-aware and goal-aware. The con-
nection between the artifact reflection and the goal changes
can be either exogenous or endogenous. However, an en-
dogenously connected system could be seen to have greater
internal motivation.
The metaphor generation system could learn via reflection
that vehicles with some properties never score highly in the
overall evaluation with current constraints (reflecting on ar-
tifacts). It could then directly modify its goal and generator
to avoid such vehicles (control of goals, control of genera-
tor).
Collaborative A collaborative system interacts with other
agents in the environment to advance a common creative
goal. It requires interaction-awareness and goal-awareness
from the system, as the system has to be able to control its
communication and adjust its own goals based on the ex-
changed messages.
A set of collaborative metaphor generation systems could,
for example, divide the metaphor search space so that
each agent operates on a distinct subspace. This requires
communication-aware coordination of how to set the indi-
vidual goals of systems.
Self-driven A self-driven system is both self-guiding
and autonomously creative. The system makes long-term
plans to acquire feasible strategies for future behavior, and
changes its goals based on its behavior (e.g. by reflecting on
the artifacts or the current generator) and the plan it cur-
rently adheres to. To rigorously adapt to new plans and
goals, a self-driven system needs to have endogenous con-
nections between reflection and control, requiring meta-self-
awareness to connect different self-awareness aspects.
A self-driven metaphor generation system could form a
similar plan as in the self-guiding example: fixing a set of
properties a vehicle must have and trying to generate as
many valuable metaphors as it can. Then, when it antici-
pates that it cannot generate any more metaphors with cur-
rent constraints, it may form a new plan with a new set of
properties the vehicle must have. At this point, it also can
directly modify its goal and generator to avoid vehicles with
the former set of properties.
All the above configurations except for “Creative” are
metacreative in a meaningful manner. For example, a self-
guiding system could be said to have a primitive form of
intent as it operates proactively and carries out previously
made plans, and an autonomously creative system satisfies
the requirements for creative autonomy by Jennings (2010).
However, there still is a gap between these configurations
and a system which is in complete control of its own devel-
opment as a creator, as even a self-driven system is not aware
of its own self-awareness and thus cannot change how it is
aware of artifacts, the generator, or its own goals. The next
level of metacreativity thus involves meta-self-awareness,
an executive process that manages other self-awareness as-
pects. It regulates their operation in order to best fulfill the
system’s current goals, and allowing it to temporarily – and
intentionally – concentrate on specific creative subspaces.
We return to this topic in Discussion and Conclusions.
Discussion and Conclusions
We have presented a model for metacreative systems, heav-
ily based on the concept of self-awareness characterized by
self-reflection and self-control as its components. In our
model, a metacreative process evolves through apt connec-
tions between reflection and control, the connections being
either exogenous (given, static) or endogenous (achieved or
learned by the system). The proposed model is modular in
the sense that the six self-awareness aspects introduced can
be combined in numerous ways to reach various configura-
tions of metacreative systems.
The proposed model does not cover all possible types of
metacreativity, and even within the covered aspects there is a
large variety of nuances that could be characterized in more
detail. However, we believe that the model contains a repre-
sentative and diverse set of high-level aspects in which cre-
ative systems are potentially metacreative. We believe that
the concepts introduced here help computational creativity
researchers better analyze and describe how their systems
are metacreative.
Designing metacreative systems The model can also be
used as a software architecture for metacreative systems. In
Figure 1, all boxes with rounded corners are possible com-
ponents of a metacreative system. For instance, the Gen-
erator Manager stands for the functionality that observes
and controls the generator. Implementing it as an explicit
component (or a set of them) allows, in turn, a meta-self-
awareness component to observe and control it.
For the design of metacreative systems, two main lessons
can be taken from software architecture design: separation
of concerns and means for increasing flexibility.
Separation of concerns is of importance for explicating
the responsibilities and functionality related to different as-
pects of metacreativity and, in particular, clearly defining the
levels of metacreativity in software.
On the other hand, to implement metacreativity, the target
elements to be modified, e.g., the Generator Manager, need
to provide the means for modifiability. A principle mecha-
nism towards modifiability is modularization that allows ac-
cess to the mechanisms controlling the element. The actual
modification mechanisms may include manipulation of the
code at runtime, parametrization of computation, dynamic
(re)configuration of the functionality, e.g., by means of plug-
in components or more sophisticated means of model-based
configuration.
MAPE-K Drawing from research in self-adaptive and
autonomous systems, our model is inspired by MAPE-K
(Kephart and Chess 2003). Reflection in our model can be
seen as a mix of monitoring (M) and analysis (A), control as
execution (E), and connections between reflection and con-
trol as a form of planning (P). However, we talk about re-
flection and control since they simplify the model, and since
they also better support describing situations where reflec-
tion and control span multiple self-awareness aspects, pos-
sibly including meta-self-awareness capabilities.
Aspects of self-awareness Two of the self-awareness as-
pects, artifact-awareness and generator-awareness, are spe-
cific to and especially interesting for creative systems. A
similar separation of artifact and process levels has been
previously brought up in computational creativity literature,
e.g. by Ritchie (2006), O’Donoghue et al. (2014) and
Wiggins (2006). The other four aspects are more general
in nature and are inspired by self-awareness levels in self-
adaptive systems (Lewis et al. 2015). However, they are for-
mulated here by taking into account specific points of view
related to creativity, and have been augmented with a control
requirement.
Relation to other models in computational creativity
Even though specific self-awareness aspects are not usu-
ally presented in computational creativity models, our model
can be used in conjunction with existing models of com-
putational creativity. For example, Colton, Charnley, and
Pease (2011) argue in their FACE model that creative sys-
tems should be able to explain and justify their creations or
processes to their audience by generating framing informa-
tion. The self-aware aspects of our model offer concrete
topics and processes for generating such framing informa-
tion. For instance, an artifact-aware system can explain its
artifacts, a generator-aware can further reflect on how it ob-
tained them, a goal-aware system can talk about its goals and
can relate the results and process to the goals.
Wiggins (2006) models creativity as search and metacre-
ativity as transformational creativity. Wiggins’ meta-level
could be seen parallel to our generator-awareness, focused
on changing the generation process based on information
about the process itself. Our model gives several additional
concepts that help analyze and describe metacreativity be-
yond artifact or process levels. Further on, with our model
we can directly point out meta-level elements which allow
a system to escape unwanted creative behaviors described
by Wiggins (2006). For example, a self-aware system can
get over generative uninspiration — the system’s inability
to find valued artifacts or concepts — by intentionally inter-
acting with others to obtain new seed artifacts, by modifying
its own goals, or by changing how the generator traverses the
creative space.
Serendipity A creative system arrives at a serendipitous
incident when the system realizes that it has unintentionally
done something valuable. With our model, we can describe
systems which may take advantage of these situations. For
example, a self-driven system is able to recognize them: it is
able to assess the value of the incident, and assess if follow-
ing it pays off better in the long run than the current plan.
That is, it does not follow the serendipitous incident blindly,
but can form a new action plan from it.
Role of meta-self-awareness In our model, meta-self-
awareness is the birthplace for many high level creative phe-
nomena. For example, specific curiosity, characterized by
Grace and Maher (2015) as a driving force of intentional
transformational behavior, would need elaborated meta-self-
awareness. Without meta-self-awareness, a system cannot
have a unified view of its state and where it should direct its
attention. This may cause the system to behave erratically
as the fragmentary curiosity of different system components
is rendered contentious.
To give a system the ability to fully be in charge of its own
development, the connections in the meta-level executive
processes have to be (partially) endogenous. A particularly
suitable class of machine learning models for these connec-
tions are intrinsic motivation models (see, e.g. Oudeyer and
Kaplan (2007)). If appropriately applied, they impose on a
system an evolving attention towards its own operation and
goals. As such, they inherently enable experimentation and
are a good fit to the open-endedness of many creative tasks.
Some intrinsic motivation models may give a system a
conation not only to try out new reflection and control con-
nections but also allow it to build up competence towards
temporarily fixed goals. For example, these models can be
applied to naturally inhibit some sensory stimuli (e.g. spe-
cific measurements from artifacts) for a while and concen-
trate on others (e.g. communication responses of specific
agents) and continuously re-evaluate and modify these con-
figurations during the system’s lifespan. In this sense, they
are promising candidates to offer means for a meta-self-
aware creative system to, e.g., exhibit diversive and specific
curiosity as discussed by Grace and Maher (2015).
To conclude, we have described six different aspects of
self-awareness that creative systems possibly exhibit. As a
conceptual tool, these aspects can be used to describe, ana-
lyze and compare creative systems. These aspects also di-
rectly suggest potential building blocks for metacreative be-
havior in creative systems.
The next obvious step is to use this model to analyze and
describe existing metacreative systems, to test its value as a
descriptive and analytical tool. An interesting topic for fu-
ture work is also designing example systems to concretely
illustrate and test some of the self-awareness aspects pre-
sented in this paper. Both the process of creating such a
system as well as the end result will be important in show-
ing the value of the model as an architecture for metacreative
software.
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